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Recent Trends in Compensation 
Inequality
Brooks Pierce
2.1    Introduction
While changing wage inequality in the United States is the subject of a 
large and vibrant literature, relatively little is known about changing inequal-
ity of compensation more broadly deﬁ  ned. Workers choose jobs partly on 
the basis of the job’s wage-  beneﬁ  ts mix, and higher-  wage workers are likely 
to choose diﬀerent mixes than lower- wage workers for a number of reasons. 
Furthermore, employers’ provision of beneﬁ  ts such as health insurance and 
pensions, and the costs associated with those beneﬁ  ts, have changed substan-
tially over the recent past. Such changes impact high-  and low- wage workers 
diﬀerently, and one might expect compensation and wage inequality to diﬀer 
in systematic and changing ways.
This chapter documents changing compensation costs for labor, and 
changing compensation inequality, using employer survey microdata on 
wages and beneﬁ  t costs. These data are rather unique in that they capture 
employer cost information for wages as well as a broad array of beneﬁ  ts 
including health insurance, deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pensions and deﬁ  ned contribu-
tion retirement savings plans, and paid leave. These data allow one to com-
pare the wage distribution to the distribution of employer costs, as deﬁ  ned 
to include these forms of compensation. The data also allow one to isolate 
changes in particular beneﬁ  ts by position in the wage distribution. Did the 
run-  up in health insurance costs over the past decade impact high-   or low- 
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wage workers more? Have increased bonuses been isolated in the highest- 
wage jobs?
The employer survey data on fringe beneﬁ  ts and wage costs show chang-
ing wage inequality broadly consistent with tabulations from household 
survey data sources (Autor, Katz, and Kierney 2008; Lemieux, chapter 1 in 
this volume). Wage inequality grew over the two- decade period from 1987 to 
2007. Wage compression occurred in the bottom half of the wage distribu-
tion, especially over the 1987 to 1997 decade. Higher-  end wages grew more 
than median or lower-  end wages throughout these two decades.
The employer cost data also indicate that beneﬁ  ts’ costs to employers rose 
more in high-  wage than low-  wage jobs. This diﬀerential growth was great 
enough so that inequality in compensation more broadly deﬁ  ned grew at 
least as much as did inequality in wages. In terms of particular fringe ben-
eﬁ  ts, health insurance costs rose substantially, especially over the 1997 to 
2007 period. Health insurance costs as a fraction of wages rose especially 
in jobs with wages near the median. Rising pension costs in the last decade 
added to compensation growth in above-  median wage jobs. There is also 
some evidence that variable pay such as sales commissions and bonuses 
played a role in compensation growth in high-  wage jobs.
I augment these data on employer-  provided fringe beneﬁ  ts with data on 
another important job-  related amenity, workplace safety. The substantial 
decline in the risk of workplace injuries over the recent past is underappre-
ciated in the labor economics literature (Nestoriak and Ruser, chapter 11 
in this volume). This secular trend toward lower risk is evident in the risk 
of both fatal and nonfatal injury. Although it is diﬃcult to cost-  out work-
place safety as a fringe beneﬁ  t, the data do allow one to compare changing 
job-  related risks of injury or fatality in high-   and low-  wage sectors of the 
economy. The improvement in workplace safety was wide ranging in that it 
occurred for a wide variety of occupations and, therefore, presumably for 
workers throughout the wage spectrum.
2.2      The Employment Cost Index (ECI) Data
The data on fringe beneﬁ  ts costs used in this chapter are from the employer 
survey microdata used to produce the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The 
ECI is a quarterly index measuring changes over time in the cost of wages 
and various nonwage compensation costs. The ECI survey scope is the civil-
ian workforce, excluding agricultural, federal government, self-  employed, 
and private household workers. The ECI survey is an establishment-  based 
survey, meaning that establishments rather than ﬁ  rms are selected for inclu-
sion in the sample. Within a sampled establishment, one to eight jobs are 
selected, depending on establishment employment. The unit of observa-
tion in the microdata is, therefore, a “job,” as determined primarily by the 
employer-  assigned job title. Information is collected on the wages, other Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    6 5
compensation costs, and work schedules of the individual incumbents in the 
sampled jobs. Various categories of nonwage compensation are collected, 
including health and life insurance, several forms of leave, pension and sav-
ings plans, bonuses, and legally required expenditures on Social Security, 
workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance. This data is con-
verted to a cost per hour worked and averaged over the incumbents within 
a job. Data are collected quarterly; quarterly samples over the 1987 to 2007 
period average about 30,000 job observations from 7,000 establishments.
Several caveats are in order. The cost data refer to employer costs, which 
will diﬀer from employee valuations due to tax and other considerations 
(Famulari and Manser 1989). The data are subject to nontrivial measure-
ment error. The survey attempts to collect data at the level of the job, but 
respondents may only be able to report data relevant for a broader group of 
workers than the job incumbents. For instance, a respondent might report an 
establishment-  wide average for white collar workers’ health insurance pre-
miums, or an establishment average employer contribution rate to a deﬁ  ned 
contribution plan. Also, the data miss variation in wages and beneﬁ  t costs 
across workers in the same job and establishment.1 The data do not contain 
information on job incumbents, such as gender or schooling levels. Much 
wage inequality research, by contrast, separately describes the experiences 
of men and women and investigates changing returns to schooling as a con-
tributory factor to inequality changes. Nonetheless, these data are some of 
the best available for this particular application as they span a substantial 
time period, include cost measures for several important fringe beneﬁ  ts, and 
are derived from employer and administrative records.
Table 2.1 gives sample means for various periods. The table gives costs 
per hour worked, beneﬁ  ts’ share of total compensation, and an incidence 
rate for some key beneﬁ  t categories. Because cost data are averaged over job 
incumbents, the fraction of jobs with positive employer costs exceed true 
coverage rates that would be derived from individual data. The hourly wage 
rate is a straight-  time hourly earnings ﬁ  gure adjusted to include overtime 
premium pay and shift diﬀerentials. Cost ﬁ  gures are deﬂ  ated to 2007 dollars 
using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-  U). The 
data are hours- weighted for all statistics presented in this chapter. However, 
published tabulations by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) using these 
data do not weight by hours worked. Hours- weighting facilitates a compari-
son with most recent published studies on wage inequality using other data 
such as the Current Population Survey (CPS).
1. Certain job characteristics (full-  time status, union status, and presence of piece rates or 
commissions) that correlate with pay and beneﬁ  ts provision also enter into the deﬁ  nition of 
the “job.” For example, full-  time and part-  time workers in the same establishment and with 
the same job title are separately subject to being sampled. Hence, diﬀerences in wages and 
beneﬁ  ts attributable to full- time status are captured in the survey and are not averaged away in 
computing a job-  level statistic.66    Brooks  Pierce
For the period as a whole, about 74 percent of ECI compensation takes the 
form of wages, and about 26 percent of compensation is in the form of bene-
ﬁ  ts. The costliest single beneﬁ  t is health insurance, with average expenditures 
of $1.77 per hour worked. Retirement and savings beneﬁ  ts costs are fairly 
substantial at $1.08 per hour worked. Retirement beneﬁ  ts include deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ  t pensions as well as deﬁ  ned contribution vehicles, such as 401(k) and 
deferred proﬁ  t sharing plans. The ECI data reﬂ  ect current pension costs, 
which in the case of deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans, can vary with pension asset returns 
and ﬁ  rms’ chosen liability accounting methods. Therefore, these costs can 
only approximate the long-  run actuarial obligation associated with a pen-
sion plan. Paid leave of various sorts accounts for costs of $1.97 an hour, on 
average. Leave is an aggregate of paid vacation time, holidays, sick leave, and 
an “other” category. Of these, the vacation and holidays components are the 
most important. Vacation and holiday beneﬁ  ts are each typically collected 
in time units at some accrual rate (four hours per biweekly pay period, eight 
days per year, etc.), converted to an hours accrued per hour worked basis and 
then valued at the job’s hourly wage. Leave may simply represent one margin 
of labor supply, or leave plans may reﬂ  ect ﬁ  rms’ attempts to monitor and 
coordinate work time. I interpret leave to also represent some ﬂ  exibility to 
the worker in scheduling hours or coordinating time for nonwork purposes. 
Table 2.1  Sample means
    1987   1997   2007  
Whole period 
average
Employer costs per hour ($)
  Wage 19.66 18.91 20.55 19.57
  Compensation 26.66 26.12 29.15 27.11
  Health  insurance 1.31 1.57 2.30 1.77
  Retirement  and  savings 1.20 1.05 1.25 1.08
  Paid  leave 2.01 1.84 2.16 1.97
Beneﬁ  t’s share in compensation
  Health  insurance .048 .058 .078 .063
  Retirement  and  savings .035 .030 .032 .030
  Paid  leave .067 .061 .062 .063
  Other  nonlegally  required .012 .014 .013 .013
  Legally  required .088 .094 .089 .092
Fraction of jobs reporting positive costs
  Health  insurance .851 .789 .789 .808
  Retirement  and  savings .663 .665 .700 .671
  Paid  leave   .930   .904   .905   .917
Notes: Cost ﬁ  gures are in CPI-  U deﬂ  ated 2007 dollars. “Retirement and savings” category 
includes deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pensions and deﬁ  ned contribution plans. “Paid leave” includes vaca-
tions, holidays, sick leave, and other paid leave. “Other nonlegally required” beneﬁ  ts include 
nonproduction bonuses, severance pay, life insurance, sickness and accident insurance, and 
supplemental unemployment insurance. “Legally required” category includes Social Security, 
Medicare, Worker’s Compensation, and state and federal unemployment insurance.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    6 7
Paid leave beneﬁ  ts are probably not captured as part of the calculated wage 
in household survey data such as the CPS, as those calculations include earn-
ings while on leave but probably do not adjust the hours worked to reﬂ  ect 
leave time. Leave is treated here as a “beneﬁ  t” in an attempt to parallel CPS 
measures. The chapter later gives results for separate beneﬁ  t components 
so that this treatment of leave does not obscure results for health insurance 
or retirement plans.
Table 2.1 also reports summary statistics on beneﬁ  t shares in compen-
sation and the fraction of the data with positive employer costs for the 
various beneﬁ  t categories. About 9.2 percent of compensation costs come 
in the form of legally required compensation, the bulk of which is attribut-
able to Social Security, Medicare, and Worker’s Compensation. Leave and 
health insurance shares are each 6.3 percent. The retirement savings category 
accounts for 3 percent of hourly employer costs, and miscellaneous other 
nonlegally required beneﬁ  ts (mainly nonproduction bonuses) account for a 
little more than 1 percent of compensation, on average. Almost 92 percent 
of the sample has some positive leave costs, about 81 percent have some 
positive health insurance costs, and about 67 percent have some positive 
retirement vehicle costs.
Table 2.1 gives beginning-  and end- of- period statistics as well. Real hourly 
wage rates in this sample grew 4.5 percent, and real hourly compensation 
grew about 8.7 percent over this period. These growth rates were larger in 
the second half of this period. Among the beneﬁ  t categories, health insur-
ance and retirement plan costs rose the most. Note that the whole-  period 
average health insurance costs are similar to the 1997 level. Health insurance 
premiums have grown at a faster rate than beneﬁ  t costs in general, except 
for a brief period in the mid-   to late-  1990s.2 There was a slight decrease in 
the fraction of jobs reporting positive health insurance costs. Not apparent 
from table 2.1 is the shift toward deﬁ  ned contribution plans, which tend 
to have lower reported employer costs. That shift has been accompanied 
by an increase in the overall fraction of jobs reporting positive retirement 
plan costs.
2.3      Wage Inequality in the ECI and CPS
One useful exercise is to compare wage dispersion in the ECI to similar 
statistics derived from CPS data. It would be convenient if the two data sets 
showed substantially similar trends in dispersion. In that case, one could 
more conﬁ  dently imagine measured ECI eﬀects on inequality due to health 
insurance and so forth as applying in a straightforward manner to the better- 
documented CPS trends. However, the two data sets do give noticeably 
diﬀerent results for some inequality growth measures. The largest diﬀerence 
2. See the ECI indexes for health insurance, tabulated at www.bls.gov/ ncs/ ect/ sp/ echealth.pdf.68    Brooks  Pierce
between the data sources appears to be the fact that measured wage growth 
in the last decade is larger in CPS than ECI data in the upper quintile of 
the wage distribution. This may reﬂ  ect diﬀerent samples or diﬀerent wage 
measures, but, in any case, it suggests that readers should exercise proper 
caution in generalizing ECI trends to other data sources.
Although the ECI and CPS data are collected and processed in quite 
diﬀerent ways, the CPS can be restricted to a sample with scope ostensibly 
similar to the ECI scope. As a practical matter, this mainly involves using 
CPS self-  reports on employment status in the “class of worker” ﬁ  elds to 
eliminate federal government and self-  employed workers. This is a crude 
proxy for the restrictions in the ECI survey scope that operate implicitly 
through the BLS sampling frame for establishment surveys, which is con-
structed mainly from required unemployment insurance (UI) reports.
To construct a CPS data sample, I take outgoing rotation group (CPS 
ORG) data on earnings for the period 1989 to 2007. The sample excludes 
agricultural industries, federal government and postal workers, the self- 
employed, and private household workers. Federal workers are identi-
ﬁ  ed separately from state and local government workers beginning in 
1989. Hourly earnings are hourly wage rates for those reporting earnings 
on an hourly basis and are usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours 
worked per week for those reporting earnings with other than hourly 
periodicity.
The resulting CPS samples have lower wages than the ECI data; the 1989 
to 2007 whole period average is $19.56 in the ECI versus $18.53 in the CPS. 
This is consistent with a view, for example, that the ECI sample panel data 
reﬂ  ects the experience of somewhat longer-  lived establishments. Both the 
CPS and ECI data exhibit slight decreases in real wages in 1989 to 1995, 
increases over the 1996 to 2002 period, and little change post-  2002.
Possibly a more relevant consideration relates to how the ECI and CPS 
wage inequality trends compare. To facilitate comparison to more standard 
CPS data results, this chapter focuses primarily on wage percentiles although 
some statistics do refer to compensation percentiles. I deﬁ  ne percentiles to 
include the 1 percent of the (weighted) data centered on the relevant percen-
tile value. Statistics of interest are averaged within percentile so deﬁ  ned. This 
averaging abstracts from the within- percentile variation in beneﬁ  t costs and 
other data elements. Smoothing away variation in beneﬁ  t costs or beneﬁ  t 
shares within percentile helps extract most of the information in the data in 
a nonparametric fashion.3
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 give wage growth by percentile for the CPS and ECI 
data for the 1989 to 1997 and 1997 to 2007 periods. During the 1989 to 1997 
3. I compute whole-  distribution dispersion measures such as the Gini coeﬃcient on micro-
data rather than percentile-  averaged data.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    6 9
period, ECI wages compressed in the bottom of the wage distribution, while 
wage inequality grew in the top half of the wage distribution. These patterns 
are evident in this CPS sample and are shown elsewhere in greater detail, 
for example, see Lemieux (chapter 1 in this volume). During the last decade, 
wage growth has been more pronounced in the CPS than the ECI, especially 
at the top end of the wage distribution. The largest diﬀerence between the 
data sources is that wage growth in the upper decile is about 5 log points 
Fig. 2.1    Wage growth by percentile, 1989–  1997
Fig. 2.2    Wage growth by percentile, 1997–  200770    Brooks  Pierce
more in the CPS than ECI data.4 But in coarse terms, the ECI and CPS tell 
similar stories about wage dispersion changes.
2.4      The Cross-  Sectional Relationship between Beneﬁ  ts Costs and Wages
The cross-  sectional relationships between beneﬁ  ts costs and wages are 
well-  established (Woodbury 1983). Nevertheless, it is useful to document 
them here as a prelude to understanding beneﬁ  t inequality growth.
Looking at beneﬁ  t costs as a share of total compensation is a useful device 
to understand how the wage diﬀerential between two jobs compares to the 
analogous compensation diﬀerential. Deﬁ  ne total compensation per hour, 
c, as wages per hour, w, plus various beneﬁ  ts per hour, bj,
c   w   ∑
j
bj   w   ∑
j
sjc
    w   sc
    
w
 
1   s
,
where sj   bj/  c is beneﬁ  t j’s share in total compensation, and s is the sum of 
these shares over the beneﬁ  t components indexed by j. Then, for example, 
the log compensation diﬀerential between jobs at the 90th percentile wage 
and the median wage can be written as
(1) ln(c90)   ln(c50)   ln(w90)   ln(w50)   [ln(1   s90)   ln(1   s50)]
 ≈  ln(w90)   ln(w50)   
(s90   s50)
  
1   s 
,
where superscripts refer to location in the wage distribution and where s  is 
the average of the 90th percentile and median beneﬁ  t shares. Note that the 
beneﬁ  t cost share at any percentile can further be split into component (sj) 
parts.
This accounting framework helps in describing contributions of separate 
beneﬁ  ts to inequality or inequality changes. It, in essence, treats beneﬁ  t costs 
as a fractional add- on to wages and asks how much the add- on diﬀers across 
the wage distribution and how the add- on diﬀerence changes through time.5
4. One possible cause for such diﬀerences lies in the fact that the ECI data tend to incorporate 
more averaging (across quarters and, especially, across individuals within a single sampled job). 
For example, the greater percentile-  to-  percentile variation in the CPS data evident in these 
ﬁ  gures, especially below the median, partially reﬂ  ects a greater bunching of observations at 
round nominal dollar ﬁ  gures.
5. Relationships like equation (1) are more simply derived using a beneﬁ  t add- on (b/  w) rather 
than a cost share. Specifying equation (1) in terms of cost shares is attractive mainly in that data 
are often tabulated and analyzed in this form. Note also that equation (1) uses the same data 
ordering for both the compensation and wage diﬀerentials. Moving from wage to compensation 
dispersion requires an additional term that quantiﬁ  es the eﬀects of resorting when moving from 
a wage to a compensation distribution.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    7 1
Figure 2.3 graphs the share of compensation costs taken in the form 
of beneﬁ  ts against the percentile of the compensation distribution, for 
the whole 1987 to 2007 period. Voluntary (not legally required) nonwage 
compensation is shown, along with all nonwage compensation. The ben-
eﬁ  t shares are relatively smooth increasing functions of the percentile. The 
immediate implication is that wage diﬀerentials tend to understate compen-
sation diﬀerentials, especially in the lower half of the wage or compensation 
distribution. The diﬀerence between the two plotted series is attributable to 
legally required compensation costs. This diﬀerence is somewhat larger at 
lower percentiles, reﬂ  ecting the fact that some of these costs have ﬁ  xed cost 
attributes. For example, unemployment insurance costs are often a percent-
age of earnings up to some relatively low earnings cutoﬀ.
Figure 2.4 graphs the beneﬁ  t share in compensation for leave, pensions 
and savings plans, and health insurance against compensation percentile. 
The health insurance share is quite low at the 10th percentile, increases rap-
idly through about the 40th percentile, stays roughly constant in the middle 
of the distribution, and tails oﬀ noticeably above the 60th percentile. Health 
beneﬁ  t costs per hour are rising over the entire range but not proportionately 
with total compensation beyond the 60th percentile. The share falls by about 
2 percentage points on a base of about 8 percentage points from the 50th 
to 90th percentiles.
The pattern that holds for health insurance is somewhat diﬀerent from 
those for leave and pensions. Although retirement compensation represents 
on average only about 2 to 3 percent of compensation, it can substantially 
Fig.  2.3  Beneﬁ  t share of compensation, 1987–  2007 average, by 
compensation percentile72    Brooks  Pierce
aﬀect inequality calculations. Jobs in the bottom quartile of the compensa-
tion distribution have very little in the way of retirement beneﬁ  ts, while jobs 
in the top decile have over 5 percent of compensation in this form. Retire-
ment compensation tends to increase compensation inequality in the upper 
as well as the lower tail of the distribution. The share of compensation 
taken as leave increases with compensation but somewhat more rapidly in 
the lower half of the distribution.
Table 2.2 brings together the results from these ﬁ  gures. The table gives 
wage and compensation dispersion across various points of the distribu-
tion and indicates each group of beneﬁ  ts’ contribution to compensation 
inequality using the approximation in equation (1). For example, the ﬁ  rst 
row indicates that the log wage diﬀerential between the 90th and 10th per-
centile of the wage distribution is 1.468. The log compensation diﬀerential 
between these two points (again, in the wage distribution) is 1.573. There-
fore, about 0.105 log points in compensation dispersion can be attributed 
to various beneﬁ  ts. Table 2.2 breaks out beneﬁ  ts by type, including “other 
voluntary” and “legally required” beneﬁ  ts categories. The wage dispersion 
column and the ﬁ  rst four beneﬁ  ts columns add up to the “voluntary dis-
persion” column; adding in the last beneﬁ  t component (“legally required”) 
gives the wage-  sorted compensation dispersion. The ﬁ  nal column of table 
2.2 gives compensation dispersion based on the compensation-  sorted 
distribution of the data. Reordering the data by compensation per hour 
rather than by the wage rate must increase overall compensation dispersion 
measures.
Consider the broadest range, the 90th to 10th diﬀerential. The leave and 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.74    Brooks  Pierce
pensions components each add .05 to .06 in log points to measured com-
pensation dispersion. Health insurance adds less, about .023. At least over 
the whole distribution, leave and pension beneﬁ  ts are more important in 
determining compensation dispersion than are health insurance beneﬁ  ts. 
The “other voluntary” category adds about .016 log points. The sum of these 
nonlegally required beneﬁ  ts gives 0.154 in log points. Legally required com-
pensation costs tend to equalize the compensation distribution substantially.
There are also interesting diﬀerences among beneﬁ  ts components across 
the various parts of the 90th to 10th percentile range. These diﬀerences are 
apparent in previously referenced ﬁ  gures: leave eﬀects occur mostly in the 
bottom half of the wage distribution, pension eﬀects operate throughout 
the distribution, and health insurance is important in adding to dispersion 
in the lower half of the distribution but is equalizing in the upper half.
2.5      Changing Wage and Compensation Inequality
Wage inequality grew over this period in the upper half of the distribution 
and shrank in the lower half of the distribution. Further, the results in table 
2.1 show some beneﬁ  t cost growth over this period. That growth did not 
occur uniformly across the wage spectrum. To see the eﬀects on compensa-
tion inequality, ﬁ  gure 2.5 overlays plots of real compensation growth by 
compensation percentile with plots of real wage growth by wage percentile. 
The top panel gives the whole 1987 to 2007 period, while the bottom panels 
give two ten-  year subperiods. Wage and compensation growth rates were 
Fig. 2.5    Wage and compensation growth by percentileRecent Trends in Compensation Inequality    7 5
highest above median values, meaning that wage and compensation inequal-
ity increased above the median. This was true for the period as a whole as 
well as for each subperiod taken separately. The greater growth rates below 
the median than at the median imply reduced inequality among medium-   
and low- wage jobs. In ECI data, that eﬀect operated in the early but not the 
later subperiod. Compensation grew slightly faster than wages, on average, 
with the diﬀerences more noticeable in the middle and upper part of the 
respective distributions. This suggests that below-  median compression is 
slightly more apparent for wages than for overall compensation.
Table 2.3 gives wage and compensation diﬀerentials across various parts 
of the distribution. Overall inequality, as measured by the standard devia-
tion or Gini coeﬃcient, increased slightly for both log wage and log compen-
sation rates in the ECI data. This is true for each subperiod. Of course, the 
experience above and below median diﬀers. The measured 90- 50 diﬀerentials 
indicate increased inequality of .103 log points for wages and .110 log points 
for compensation over the whole period. The analogous 50-  10 diﬀerential 
indicate compression of .049 for wages and .007 for compensation. Table 
2.3 also shows statistics derived from the CPS ORG data for 1989 to 2007. 
Although the statistics generally agree with the ECI wage data, the CPS data 
show greater inequality growth over the 1997 to 2007 subperiod, especially 
above the median.
To sum up, in the 1987 to 1997 period, there was wage compression below 
Table 2.3  Wage and compensation dispersion
Percentile diﬀerentials
    Standard deviation   90–10  90–50  50–10  Gini coeﬃcient
I. Employment Cost Index data
A. Log wage
  1987 .564 1.456 .723 .733 .317
  1997 .578 1.474 .804 .671 .329
  2007 .592 1.510 .828 .684 .340
  Change  1987–2007 .029 .054 .103 –.049 .023
B. Log compensation
  1987 .597 1.563 .738 .825 .326
  1997 .620 1.612 .829 .783 .346
  2007 .639 1.666 .848 .818 .354
  Change  1987–2007 .042 .103 .110 –.007 .028
II. Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data
A. Log wage
  1989 .566 1.452 .733 .719 .318
  1997 .585 1.475 .780 .695 .331
  2007 .608 1.530 .845 .685 .343
  Change  1989–2007  .042   .078   .112   –.034   .035
Note: See text for sample details.76    Brooks  Pierce
median and wage expansion above median, and compensation growth mod-
estly exceeded wage growth above the median(s). In the 1997 to 2007 period, 
compensation growth was greater than wage growth everywhere but at low 
percentile values. As a result, it appears that compensation growth totalled 
over the twenty- year period was greater than wage growth and slightly more 
so in the upper half of the respective distributions.
2.6    Beneﬁ  ts’ Contribution to Inequality Growth
As discussed previously, changing beneﬁ  t cost shares give some sense for 
how compensation and wage growth diﬀer. This section documents indi-
vidual beneﬁ  ts’ contributions to inequality growth by in essence describing 
how the beneﬁ  t share-  percentile relationships shown in ﬁ  gure 2.4 changed 
through time.
2.6.1    Health  Insurance
Health insurance diﬀers from the other main beneﬁ  t components in that 
changing relative prices in the form of rising insurance premiums are behind 
many of the observed changes. Higher health insurance costs have likely 
induced ﬁ  rm and worker adjustments such as higher plan costs directly 
borne by the worker, greater ﬁ  rm reliance on part- time workers, and possibly 
adjustments to wage rates paid. The employer cost data as used here reﬂ  ect 
such adjustments as well as the underlying relative price shifts.6
Figure 2.6 shows how the beneﬁ  t share for health insurance has changed, 
by percentile in the wage distribution. In this ﬁ  gure, the beneﬁ  t shares for 
1987, 1997, and 2007 are smoothed (over wage percentile) and overlaid. 
Table 2.1 shows that health insurance costs rose at a faster rate than wages 
over this period. Figure 2.6 also shows greater share growth in the 1997 
to 2007 subperiod. This makes some sense in light of health management 
organization (HMO)-  related premium growth slowdown of the mid-  1990s, 
which gave way to more usual rates of medical price inﬂ  ation by the end of 
the 1990s.
Health insurance premium growth without other changes would cause 
proportionate increases (not a parallel shift) in the cost share, but ﬁ  gure 2.6 
shows more-  than-  proportionate increases among jobs with wages in the 
middle half of the wage distribution. Jobs in the highest quartile experienced 
substantial beneﬁ  t cost growth but also experienced rapid wage growth. That 
accounts for the relatively moderate health insurance share growth in high- 
wage jobs. Jobs in the lower quartile experienced greater wage growth than 
did jobs in, say, percentiles 30 to 60. Below-  median wage jobs may be ones 
where worker and ﬁ  rm adjustments occur most. One suspects that part- time 
6. For some evidence on the eﬀects of increased health insurance premiums, see Baicker and 
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and full-  time jobs are more substitutable from the employer’s perspective 
for jobs with below-  median wage rates. It is also possible that lower-  wage 
workers are more price sensitive to health insurance premium growth and 
that changing health insurance participation plays a role for them as well.
An open question at this point is whether changing oﬀer or take-  up rates 
have aﬀected employers’ costs. Because the ECI unit of observation is a job 
within an establishment, one cannot readily calculate a health insurance 
coverage rate analogous to what one might calculate from household survey 
data. The closest construct involves calculating the fraction of the sample 
with positive employer costs for health plans. Such a calculated fraction 
is conceptually closer to an employer oﬀer rate than a health insurance 
coverage rate. If employers continue to oﬀer health plans but fewer work-
ers within a job take up the oﬀer, then the ECI data will tend to reﬂ  ect that 
change not as a lower incidence rate but, instead, as lower employer costs 
for given incidence.
The March CPS is a good source for health insurance coverage rate data 
(see Levy [2006] and Farber and Levy [2000] for studies using various CPS 
supplements). The March CPS identiﬁ  es those with health insurance cov-
erage and determines whether that coverage is through the individual’s 
employer (although we do not know if an uninsured worker’s employer 
oﬀered health insurance). The March CPS supplement data is retrospective 
in that it asks about earnings and hours worked in jobs in the prior year. The 
wage measure for the March sample is derived as annual wage and salary 
earnings, divided by the product of weeks worked and usual hours worked 
per week in the prior year. I impose several exclusions in the CPS data so that 
Fig. 2.6    Health insurance share by wage percentile78    Brooks  Pierce
it more closely resembles the ECI sample. This primarily involves exclud-
ing self-  employed workers and workers in the federal sector. I also restrict 
the CPS sample to full-  time, year-  round workers. I restrict attention to the 
1992 to 2007 period, which is the time frame available at this writing from 
the Census Bureau’s automated download Web site.
Table 2.4 shows the trends in CPS and ECI incidence rates, as well as the 
trend in ECI health insurance costs, measured here relative to compensation 
in the form of a share. Note that the compensation share fell substantially 
over the early 1994 to 2000 period. The ECI for health insurance beneﬁ  ts 
did, in fact, become negative (or eﬀectively zero) for some isolated quarters 
over this time period. Over the later 2000 to 2007 period, the health insur-
ance share in compensation rose by more than enough to oﬀset the early 
period decline.
Figure 2.7 juxtaposes March CPS and ECI incidence measures by posi-
tion in the wage distribution. Here wage position is summarized by quintiles; 
I use coarser wage distributions because March CPS data has fewer observa-
tions and, perhaps, diﬀerent wage measures than the CPS ORG data refer-
enced earlier. As expected, the ECI positive cost incidence measure exceeds 
Table 2.4  Health insurance plan trends
ECI Data








FTYR workers  
1992 .820 .065 .707
1993 .816 .066 .710
1994 .808 .065 .701
1995 .796 .062 .682
1996 .797 .060 .688
1997 .786 .057 .681
1998 .784 .056 .683
1999 .785 .057 .689
2000 .787 .059 .682
2001 .803 .062 .674
2002 .804 .066 .668
2003 .800 .070 .658
2004 .793 .072 .653
2005 .793 .075 .647
2006 .795 .076 .640
  2007  .788   .077      
Notes: March Current Population Survey (CPS) coverage rates refer to a sample of full-  time, 
year-  round (FTYR) workers (who usually work thirty-  ﬁ  ve or more hours per week, for ﬁ  fty 
or more weeks in the year prior to the survey). The CPS sample is chosen to roughly corre-
spond to the Employment Cost Index (ECI) scope and so excludes federal government and 
unincorporated self-  employed workers, private household workers, and workers in agricul-
tural industries.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    7 9
the CPS individual- based coverage rate. The diﬀerence between measures is 
fairly small in the bottom quintile but otherwise does not vary greatly with 
position in the wage distribution.
Figure 2.8 compares the CPS coverage rate over time at diﬀerent points 
in the wage distribution. The coverage rate fell over time for each quintile 
group. The decrease was not particularly greater at lower than higher wage 
quintiles. Figure 2.9 shows the comparable ﬁ  gure using the ECI incidence 
measure. The ECI measure fell, but only modestly, over this period. One 
hypothesis is that the health insurance coverage rate declines found in the 
CPS data are more due to declining rates of take-  up than to declining rates 
of employer oﬀer. Of course, health insurance oﬀers typically come condi-
tional on worker contributions to costs, and employers may have changed 
the terms of oﬀer over this period (Blostin and Pfuntner 1998). One impli-
cation is that the cost data in the ECI will reﬂ  ect not only general health 
insurance premium inﬂ  ation, but also any declining propensity for workers 
to enroll in employer-  based health plans. However, the CPS data appears 
to imply that changing take-  up rates were not a substantial cause for the 
diﬀerences by percentile in the health insurance share growth exhibited in 
ﬁ  gure 2.6 during the later 1997 to 2007 decade. The ECI coverage rates did 
fall, and disproportionately so, in lower wage jobs in the 1987 to 1992 period. 
Other CPS data (Farber and Levy (2000)) suggest falling coverage rates 
during that period as well, so it is likely that changing coverage or take-  up 
patterns can explain some of the distributional patterns in the 1987 to 1997 
period displayed in ﬁ  gure 2.6.
Fig. 2.7    Health insurance incidence by wage percentiles, 1992–  2006 averageFig. 2.8    Health insurance incidence by wage percentiles, 1992 and 2006
Fig. 2.9    Health insurance incidence by wage percentiles, 1992 and 2006Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    8 1
2.6.2      Retirement and Savings Plans
Figure 2.10 gives beneﬁ  t cost share series for the retirement and savings 
category. For the whole period change, the series are noisy, and no large 
change is apparent. It is safe to say that the percentile range chosen for anal-
ysis matters. Over the 1997 to 2007 subperiod, there is some evidence that 
retirement beneﬁ  ts have contributed to increased dispersion in compensa-
tion in above-  median wage jobs.
In describing the trends in retirement and savings plan costs, it is useful 
to distinguish between deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t (DB) and deﬁ  ned contribution (DC) 
plan costs. The ECI began separately publishing statistics for these catego-
ries in 1996. The DB and DC plans tend to look diﬀerent in terms of the 
distributional accounting. Figure 2.11 shows the fraction of the sample, as 
averaged across the years 1996 to 2007, with positive employer costs at given 
wage percentile for each of the two categories. The DC plan costs tend to 
be more prevalent than the DB plan costs, especially at and below the 80th 
percentile wage. Figure 2.12 gives beneﬁ  t shares for DB and DC plans sepa-
rately. The DB plan costs exceed the DC plan costs, on average, over this 
period. This is entirely an above-  median phenomenon.
The whole period averages in ﬁ  gures 2.11 and 2.12 obscure some impor-
tant trend changes. Table 2.5 shows these trends. Of course, DC plans have 
become increasingly prevalent, while no new DB plans (other than cash 
balance plan conversions) have been started for (literally) years. But table 
2.5 also shows some important changes in the employer costs associated 
with the two types of plans. The DC plan cost shares increased slightly 
Fig. 2.10    Retirement share by wage percentile82    Brooks  Pierce
over this period. However, the DB plan costs fell substantially from 1996 
to 2002, then rose tremendously over the following short period of time. 
From 2002 to 2007, the DB plan costs per hour rose about 50 percent. The 
rapid change after 2002 is widespread in the ECI data and is not due to 
sample turnover. This rapid increase is likely a response to falling pension 
Fig. 2.11    Fraction with positive retirement plan costs, 1996–  2007 average, by 
wage percentile
Fig. 2.12     Retirement plan beneﬁ  t shares, 1996–  2007 average, by wage percentileRecent Trends in Compensation Inequality    8 3
funding levels brought on by declines in the market value of stocks. Pen-
sion fund assets include company stock, and falling stock values eventually 
require further dedication of assets to maintain fund solvency. The observed 
time lag accords with accounting rules allowing averaging or smoothing 
responses to plan underfunding over multiple years.7
Because DB plans have a larger eﬀect on above-  median wage jobs, this 
surge in DB plan contributions had a noticeable impact on compensation 
growth above the median and on compensation dispersion measures. It is 
likely that DB compensation cost growth above the median understated 
true values of added actuarial pension obligations early in this period (when 
stock values were rising) and overstated true values in the more recent past. 
The DB plan cost growth, at least as measured in the ECI data, slowed in 
2007 to 2008, but a recent large stock market downturn may reverse this 
trend. Whether DB plan costs are a near-  term driver for compensation dis-
persion increases will likely depend on what happens to DB pension funding 
levels going forward.
2.6.3      Variable Pay: Nonproduction Bonuses and Incentive Pay
Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2007) suggest that performance- pay jobs 
were important vehicles for changing wage inequality during the 1980s, espe-
cially at the top end of the male wage distribution. The ECI data do have 
Table 2.5  Retirement and savings plan trends










1996 .413 .019 .436 .011
1997 .384 .018 .451 .012
1998 .370 .017 .465 .012
1999 .354 .016 .490 .013
2000 .337 .014 .508 .014
2001 .335 .014 .539 .015
2002 .336 .013 .541 .014
2003 .338 .014 .545 .014
2004 .338 .018 .544 .014
2005 .338 .019 .547 .014
2006 .326 .019 .559 .014
2007  .312   .018   .561   .014
Note: The Bureau of Labor Statistics began publishing separate statistics for deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t 
and deﬁ  ned contribution plans with 1996 data.
7. Pension Beneﬁ  t Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) premium revenues rose substan-
tially after 2002, reﬂ  ecting deteriorating plan funding (PBGC 2006, available at www.pbgc
.gov/ docs/ 2006databook.pdf).84    Brooks  Pierce
some information relevant to the general question of whether variable pay 
is an important conduit for wage growth.8
The ECI data distinguish between variable pay directly tied to individual 
worker product and other bonuses. Variable pay directly tied to worker 
product includes piece rates and sales commissions. Those payments are 
reported as part of worker earnings and are not broken out separately. 
However, in more recent ECI data, jobs subject to such production bonuses 
are identiﬁ  ed separately. Those jobs are referred to here as “incentive- 
pay” jobs.
Bonuses not tied directly to individual worker product are reported sepa-
rately from earnings. Examples of such bonuses might include end-  of-  year 
payments tied to revenues generated by a broader employee group or busi-
ness line. Those payments are referred to here and in BLS tabulations using 
these microdata as “nonproduction bonuses.” These payments are the main 
component of the “other voluntary” or “other nonlegally required” beneﬁ  ts 
categories shown in table 2.2.9
Over the 1994 to 2007 period, on average, about 5.8 percent of the jobs in 
the ECI are incentive-  pay jobs. As is well-  known, these jobs are often sales- 
related or managerial jobs, but incentive- pay jobs also appear in service and 
blue-  collar occupations as well. Figure 2.13 gives the 1994 to 2007 average 
incentive-  pay incidence fraction by wage percentile. The ﬁ  gure shows that 
these jobs are observed broadly throughout the wage distribution. Jobs with 
above-  median wages are somewhat more likely to have an incentive-  pay 
component. However, jobs with wages in the very upper tail are much more 
likely to have an incentive-  pay component. For instance, over the 1994 to 
2007 period, 14.6 percent of jobs in the upper 3.5 percent of wages have an 
incentive pay component.10 Incentive-  pay jobs in the very upper tail of the 
wage distribution are often in ﬁ  nancial services industries.
Over the 1994 to 2007 period, the ECI samples show a slight decrease in 
the fraction of jobs with incentive-  pay components. The 1994 ﬁ  gure is 6.2 
percent versus a 5.2 percent ﬁ  gure for 2007. The proﬁ  le with respect to the 
wage distribution does not appear to exhibit any pronounced trend. That is, 
incentive-  pay jobs do not appear to have become increasingly concentrated 
in higher-  wage jobs over this period.
About 38.4 percent of the ECI data over the 1987 to 2007 period have 
positive nonproduction bonuses. Figure 2.14 shows this fraction by wage 
percentile for the 1987 to 2007 pooled period. Note that the fraction with 
8. I thank Anthony Barkume for helpful discussions on variable pay.
9. The ECI survey scope excludes workers who set their own pay, including owners and direc-
tors who might be paid substantially via nonproduction bonuses. The intent is to restrict the 
data to arms-  length transactions. Tips are not part of any compensation in the ECI.
10. Incentive- pay jobs tend to pay more than observationally similar jobs without incentive- 
pay mechanisms (Barkume 2004). The wage premium might reﬂ  ect induced eﬀort, risk premi-
ums, unobserved positive selection on ability, or other factors. Other BLS establishment survey 
data also show, at least in recent data, that incentive-  pay jobs tend to have greater within-  job 
wage dispersion. As discussed earlier, ECI data do not capture that variability.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    8 5
positive nonproduction bonus payments is higher in above-  than below- 
median wage jobs. However, there is not an apparent uptick in incidence at 
the highest wage levels.
Figure 2.15 shows the fraction of compensation attributable to nonpro-
duction bonuses, conditional on receiving such a bonus, by wage percentile 
for the pooled 1987 to 2007 period. The ﬁ  gure shows the raw averages plotted 
Fig. 2.13    Fraction with incentive pay, 1994–  2007 average, by wage percentile
Fig. 2.14    Fraction with nonproduction bonus, 1987–  2007 average, by wage percentile86    Brooks  Pierce
alongside a regression prediction based on the lower 90 percentiles. Clearly 
the upper decile has nonproduction bonus payments exceeding what one 
might expect based on patterns in the lower 9 deciles. Taken together, ﬁ  gures 
2.14 and 2.15 indicate that nonproduction bonuses tend to increase disper-
sion in the cross section; this is why the statistics in the “other voluntary” 
column of table 2.2 are consistently positive. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 further 
indicate that dispersion may be more sensitive to nonproduction bonus pay-
ments in jobs in the upper wage decile than elsewhere in the distribution, a 
result not apparent from table 2.2.
Figure 2.16 shows the fraction of compensation attributable to nonpro-
duction bonuses by wage percentile, in 1987, 1997, and 2007. Although the 
scale of change is small relative to the wage growth shown in ﬁ  gure 2.5, ﬁ  gure 
2.16 shows that increased nonproduction bonuses in jobs in the upper half 
of the wage distribution did contribute to increased compensation disper-
sion over this period. This contribution is most evident in the upper decile 
of the wage distribution.
To sum up, very-  high-  wage jobs tend to have a higher incidence of sales 
commissions and piece rate pay. Because we do not know sales commis-
sions and other variable-  pay components separately from other earnings, 
we cannot tabulate them as a source of wage growth. It is possible that 
ﬂ  uctuations in those forms of variable pay could disproportionately aﬀect 
compensation dispersion at the very top of the ECI distribution. The ECI 
does separately identify nonproduction bonuses. Such bonuses are not direct 
commissions or piece rates but are better thought of as discretionary annual 
payments from a bonus pool. Bonuses have acted (in an accounting sense) 
Fig. 2.15    Bonus share conditional on receipt, 1987–  2007 average, by wage percentileRecent Trends in Compensation Inequality    8 7
to increase compensation dispersion above the median over the 1987 to 
2007 period.
2.6.4    Point  Estimates
Table 2.6 provides point estimates and standard errors for some of the 
trends described in the preceding. The ﬁ  rst column gives the change in wage 
dispersion over the 1987 to 2007 period for the relevant percentile range. The 
next four columns give the contribution of beneﬁ  t categories to compensa-
tion inequality, as operationalized by equation (1). The last column in the 
table gives changing dispersion in total compensation, where the distribu-
tional range continues to be deﬁ  ned based on points in the wage distribution. 
The point estimates for the beneﬁ  t contribution columns are often small and 
not statistically diﬀerent from zero. However, a case can be made that some 
health insurance cost changes contributed toward equalizing compensation 
diﬀerentials at or above the median wage, and contributed toward increased 
compensation diﬀerentials when comparing low-  wage and median-  wage 
jobs. Retirement and savings plan costs contributed only modestly to greater 
compensation dispersion in the upper half of the distribution. Leave costs 
growth tended to increase compensation dispersion over this period. For 
example, incorporating leave to obtain a better per- hour- worked wage mea-
sure would result in somewhat larger observed inequality growth in the ECI 
over this period.
As a general statement, it appears that including beneﬁ  ts costs in compen-
sation measures would result in inequality growth at least as great as that 
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observed in wage rates alone. The reader will, of course, have noted that 
this result depends on time period and the particular inequality measures 
chosen. That, at least, is one advantage to looking at the nonparametric 
graphs presented earlier.
2.7    Workplace  Safety
The discussion thus far has centered on costing out various forms of compen-
sation that are not part of earnings. Of course, some job attributes are implicit 
and not so amenable to costing out in this fashion. Hamermesh (1999a,b) 
relates increased wage inequality and changing incidence of other such job 
attributes. This section discusses results for one attribute, workplace safety.
The BLS conducts the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses 
(SOII), an annual survey of employers used to estimate the number of non-
fatal work-  related injuries. As part of that eﬀort, the BLS collects informa-
tion on injured workers and the characteristics of the injuries for the sub-
set of injuries that require days away from work (see Nestoriak and Ruser, 
chapter 11 in this volume). In addition, the BLS conducts an annual census 
of fatal work-  related injuries (the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 
or CFOI program). While these data do not include direct wage measures, 
they do include factors that correlate with wages, such as age and gender 
of the aﬀected worker, the occupation held by the worker, and the industry 
of the employer.
In order to create graphs analogous to those in the preceding for health or 
pension beneﬁ  ts, I construct injury and fatality rates and plot them against 
wages. Wage positionals are calculated using CPS ORG wage data, and cell 
means of on-  the-  job injury and fatality risk are assigned to individuals and 
their associated wage positional. Individual risk is proxied with cell average 
risk.
To be more speciﬁ  c, I construct injury and fatality rates for cells given 
by year, gender, age group, coarse industry group (goods producing ver-
sus other), and occupation. The denominator for the rate statistics are cell 
totals for hours worked as constructed using CPS Basic Monthly survey 
data. These cell-  speciﬁ  c injury rates are merged to CPS ORG individual 
level data. Individual wage rates form the basis for a wage positional, and 
the injury rate estimate for the individual’s gender- age- industry- occupation 
cell is, in eﬀect, an imputed work-  related injury risk. Because occupation 
is an important correlate of wages and injury risk, I construct cells so that 
much of the variation in the data comes from the occupational dimension 
(there are ﬁ  ve age groups, two genders, two industries, and approximately 
forty occupational categories).11 Because of changing occupational codes, 
11. Hamermesh’s (1999a) study on workplace safety used industry variation, for an earlier 
period.90    Brooks  Pierce
the time frame is limited to 1994 to 2002 data. The SOII data at the national 
level are available for private-  sector workers.
Figure 2.17 shows the cross- sectional relationship between wage position 
and imputed work-  related injury risk. Unlike earlier graphs, better work 
environments display as lower values in the graph (risk is a negative ame-
nity). The relative injury risk for a cell during any year is the particular 
cell’s injury rate for that year, divided by the year’s injury rate aggregated 
over cells. Because the risk measure is relative, the measure averages to 1 
within year. Figure 2.17 shows data for the entire pooled period. The obvi-
ous point is that higher wage workers are in cells with lower work-  related 
injury risk. This appears to be especially true at the highest wage positions. 
Because much of the constructed variation is along occupational lines, 
this is a statement mainly about the occupations that high-  wage workers 
occupy.
There were quite large declines in injury rates over this period. The rate 
of injuries and illnesses requiring days away from work fell from 2.8 per 
100 full-  time equivalent (FTE) workers in 1994 to 1.6 per 100 FTE in 2002. 
This raises a question of what sorts of occupations, industries, and work-
ers disproportionately experienced those declines. Figure 2.18 tries to get 
at that question by graphing the begin-   and end-  of-  period cross-  sectional 
relationships analogous to the whole-  period average shown in ﬁ  gure 2.17. 
Here the relative risk measure incorporates changes through time. That is, 
a cell’s injury risk is now measured not relative to the year’s average injury 
rate, but relative to the whole 1994 to 2002 average. To help eliminate noise, 
Fig. 2.17    Work-  related injury risk, 1994–  2002 average, by wage percentileRecent Trends in Compensation Inequality    9 1
I average three years of data at the beginning and end of this time window, 
so the change is approximately a six-  year change.
The risk measure shown here fell more for lower-  wage workers. Because 
much of the variation here is along an occupational dimension, and because 
there is not much change over time in which cells are high-  wage and which 
are low-  wage, ﬁ  gure 2.18 implies the declining injury risk apparent in the 
total trend in injury rates is broad- based occupationally. In fact, injury rates 
are declining by similar proportions (but diﬀerent percentage amounts) in 
almost all of the occupational categories used here. That is, the risk decline 
was proportionate to the initial probability of injury.
Figures 2.19 and 2.20 give analogous results for fatality rates. Fatalities 
are documented in the CFOI, an annual accounting of all work- related fatal 
injuries in the United States. To make results here comparable in scope to the 
earlier injury results, I restrict the analysis to private- sector employees. Fatal-
ity rates are constructed using employment and hours worked data from 
the CPS basic monthly ﬁ  les. Cells are the same as in the injury rate analysis, 
meaning that cells are deﬁ  ned by occupation, gender, age group, and coarse 
industry. As in the injury rate analysis, wage positionals are deﬁ  ned for CPS 
ORG data, and each individual is assigned a probability of fatality equal to 
the cell average fatality rate.
Figure 2.19 gives whole-  period average relative risk. The plot actually 
slopes up in the lowest wage quintile and is roughly ﬂ  at between, say, the 
25th and 75th wage percentile. This is partly due to the very large gender 
diﬀerences in fatality propensity: women tend to have lower wages, and 
Fig. 2.18    Injury risk improvements by wage percentile92    Brooks  Pierce
women have a much lower propensity of suﬀering a work-  related fatality.12 
Beyond the 75th percentile, the risk of fatality declines sharply as one moves 
12. Were ﬁ  gure 2.19 restricted to male workers, the graph would show a downward sloping 
curve beyond approximately the 25th percentile (where percentile still refers to place in the 
pooled distribution, not to the gender-  speciﬁ  c distribution). The upward sloping and ﬂ  at por-
tions of ﬁ  gure 2.19 are due to gender composition shifts. However, the results shown in ﬁ  gure 
2.20 are not at all sensitive to pooling men and women.
Fig. 2.19    Work-  related fatality risk, 1994–  2002 average, by wage percentile
Fig. 2.20    Fatality risk improvements by wage percentileRecent Trends in Compensation Inequality    9 3
up the wage distribution. The reader will note that the range of relative risk 
shown in ﬁ  gure 2.19 is smaller than that shown in ﬁ  gure 2.17 for fatalities. 
Note also that the plot for fatalities is noisier than that for injuries because 
fatalities are relatively rare events.
Figure 2.20 shows trend changes. As in ﬁ  gure 2.18, three- year averages are 
taken at the beginning and end of the period. For fatalities, there has been 
a fairly substantial reduction in risk over this period although the change 
is not of the same magnitude as the reduction in nonfatal injury risk. The 
reduction in fatality propensity was modestly larger in the upper quintile of 
the wage distribution. This is a somewhat diﬀerent picture than the change 
in injury risk.
However, these are qualitative results, in the sense that risk is not priced- 
out, as the employer-  provided beneﬁ  ts discussed earlier can be to some 
degree. Of course, this risk is notoriously diﬃcult to price-  out, and, in fact, 
these graphs serve as a reminder that compensating diﬀerentials for risk are 
often estimated to be negative. The most reasonable summary of these ﬁ  nd-
ings is that the safety improvements in ﬁ  gures 2.18 and 2.20 are widespread 
with respect to wage.
2.8    Conclusion
The intent of this chapter is to present facts on the level and distri-
bution of fringe beneﬁ  ts, on the relationship between wages and fringe 
beneﬁ  ts, and on how these relationships have changed over the past two 
decades. It seems clear that health insurance premium increases acted 
to raise measured compensation more for workers in jobs in the broad 
middle of the wage distribution. There is some further evidence that other 
employer- provided  beneﬁ  ts’ costs rose most in those portions of the wage 
distribution experiencing the greatest wage growth. In total, inequality in 
compensation more broadly deﬁ  ned increased at least as much as wage 
inequality. It further appears that work-  related safety risk improvement 
was broad-  based and not concentrated in particular occupations over this 
period.
The changes documented here point to several interesting open ques-
tions. One set of questions relates to how wages and compensation adjust 
in response to the recessionary environment of 2008 to 2009. For example, 
there may be a recessionary impact on wages and bonuses in high-  wage, 
incentive-  pay jobs, which are frequently in sectors such as ﬁ  nance, which 
were particularly impacted by the recession. As another example, declining 
pension plan funding levels could eventually lead to greater employer pen-
sion contributions, especially for high-  wage workers.
A second set of open questions relates to the labor market adjustments 
to more expensive health insurance. Because it has certain ﬁ  xed cost attri-
butes, rising premiums are especially likely to impact low-  to moderate- wage 94    Brooks  Pierce
workers with employer-  provided health insurance coverage. To what extent 
will employers adjust by shifting employment to part-  time or high-  skill, 
long- hours jobs? Or pass on costs through required employee contributions 
or lowered wages?
A third open question is whether observed patterns in fringe beneﬁ  t cost 
growth are partly attributable to income eﬀects. If wages are rising faster for 
some workers than others, and if beneﬁ  ts or workplace amenities are income 
elastic, then wage inequality changes will cause predictable changes in ben-
eﬁ  ts provisions. This is explicitly the view of Hammermesh (1999a,b) and 
Pierce (2001). Determining the extent of the income eﬀects is challenging 
because conﬂ  ating factors, including substitution eﬀects, may diﬀerentially 
operate across the wage distribution. For example, it is not clear that tech-
nical innovations in workplace safety provision were neutral with respect 
to the wage. To the extent that fringe beneﬁ  ts are income elastic, beneﬁ  ts 
growth will tend to reinforce wage growth and broader- based compensation 




For background on the ECI, see also U.S. Department of Labor (1997).
Panel Aspects and Weighting
The ECI measures changing wages and compensation costs over a sample 
of ﬁ  xed jobs. To do so, it follows panels of sampled establishments and jobs 
over multiple quarters. Sample replenishment takes the form of replacing a 
small fraction of establishments every quarter. The new subsample, except 
for subsequent attriters, remains in the ECI sample for approximately four 
and a half years. Sample weights are constructed at the time of initiation 
into the sample and reﬂ  ect aggregate employment in the industry.
The panel aspect of the data raises some issues relevant to treating the data 
as annual cross sections. To correct for attrition, sample weights are adjusted 
quarter by quarter so that the cross section maintains a proper industry dis-
tribution. This reweighting does not correct for nonrandom attrition within 
industry or the fact that the distribution of sampled jobs is static within 
panel. This treatment is similar to what the BLS undertakes in producing its 
annual Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) release. Also, 
cross sections are not independent at high frequencies. Finally, the data are 
hours-  weighted. Published ECEC statistics are not hours-  weighted.Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    9 5
Leave Costs and Scheduled Hours versus Hours Worked
The ECI calculates leave costs as the hourly wage times the ratio of leave 
hours to hours worked (which is scheduled hours minus leave hours). A 
perfectly logical treatment would be to add leave costs so deﬁ  ned to the 
wage rate to obtain a better estimate of wages per hour worked. However, 
it is unlikely that CPS wage rates net-  out leave time in this manner, and I, 
therefore, do not, in hopes of making wage measures across the two data 
sets more comparable.
Within-  Job Compensation Variation
One way in which ECI-  based inequality statistics diﬀer from those based 
on household survey data is that the ECI microdata unit of observation is 
the job rather than the individual. The inequality statistics presented in the 
chapter are, therefore, interpretable as what one would observe using indi-
vidual microdata, except that individuals’ wages and beneﬁ  t costs are prox-
ied by their job averages. That is, one misses within- job wage and beneﬁ  t cost 
dispersion. From a ﬁ  rm’s perspective, this may not be very relevant—the 
within-  job dispersion in, say, health insurance take-  up rates may reﬂ  ect ex 
post outcomes rather than ex ante expected costs—but it would be relevant 
from the perspective of the individual workers.
For wage rates, evidence from other establishment survey data suggests 
that relatively little of the total log wage variation is within-  job (Groshen 
1991). More recent evidence from another establishment survey, the Na-
tional Compensation Survey, indicates that within-  job log wage variance 
is on the order of 3 to 4 percent of total log wage variance (calculations 
by author). The sampling design and data collection for these surveys are 
similar, suggesting that wage dispersion measures as presented in the paper 
are quite like what would obtain were individual wage rates observed.
I have little evidence on within-  job diﬀerences in beneﬁ  t costs. Within- 
job dispersion in legally required beneﬁ  t costs should approximately equal 
the within-  job wage dispersion because those costs tend to be direct func-
tions of earnings. And obviously there is no within- job variance where costs 
are zero, which is a substantial portion of the data for some beneﬁ  ts. For 
observations with positive voluntary beneﬁ  ts costs, one can conceptually 
attribute within-  job cost diﬀerences to diﬀerences in employer oﬀers or in 
employees’ take-  up. One would expect within-  job diﬀerences in employer 
beneﬁ  t oﬀers to be small because of nondiscrimination rules and the desire 
to be perceived as treating similar workers in a similar fashion. Note in this 
regard that ECI sampling treats full-  time and part-  time workers as occupy-
ing diﬀerent jobs, even if they have the same job title (the same treatment 
holds for diﬀerences in union status and incentive-  pay status). Therefore, 
any dispersion due to full-  time or part-  time diﬀerentials in health insur-96    Brooks  Pierce
ance (etc.) oﬀers will be reﬂ  ected in the ECI data as dispersion across jobs 
and so will be incorporated in the paper’s inequality calculations. The data 
will, however, miss within-  job diﬀerences in take-  up or intensity of use for 
beneﬁ  ts, such as deﬁ  ned contribution plans and health insurance, which one 
suspects can be substantial.
CPS Data
Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) Data
Outgoing panels from the CPS are asked supplemental questions on earn-
ings, hours worked, and various aspects of their current job. These are fairly 
well-  known data, and so I refer readers elsewhere for details (see, for ex-
ample, Lemieux, chapter 1 in this volume). To construct data similar in scope 
to the ECI, I exclude agricultural industries, federal government and postal 
workers, the self- employed, and private household workers. The ECI survey 
scope explicitly excludes workers who set their own pay, so I exclude the 
self-  employed, whether they are incorporated or unincorporated. Federal 
workers are identiﬁ  ed separately from state and local government workers 
beginning in 1989.
Hourly earnings are hourly wage rates for those reporting earnings on an 
hourly basis and are usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked 
per week for those reporting earnings with other than hourly periodicity. 
Topcoded earnings are multiplied by 1.5 prior to calculating hourly wages, 
which is a typical treatment in the literature. Very-  low-  wage rate observa-
tions (  $1 nominal) are discarded. For the remaining distribution, wages 
are bottom-  coded at one-  half the minimum wage, topcoded at $200 per 
hour, and deﬂ  ated using the CPI-  U. This is a similar treatment to the ECI 
microdata, except for the topcoding. In ECI data, very-  high-  wage rates 
arise from valid but large earnings responses; in CPS data, very-  high wages 
often arise from suspiciously low reported hours. This topcoding treat-
ment does not qualitatively alter the chapter’s ﬁ  ndings. Statistics are hours- 
weighted.
March CPS Data
Sections of this paper describing health insurance coverage use data from 
the March CPS supplements. March CPS data are retrospective, referring 
to individuals’ prior year employment. The wage measure for the March 
sample is derived as annual wage and salary earnings, divided by the prod-
uct of weeks worked and usual hours worked per week in the prior year. 
To construct data similar in scope to the ECI, I exclude agricultural indus-
tries, federal government and postal workers, the self- employed, and private 
household workers. I also restrict the CPS sample to full-  time, year-  round 
workers. At the time of this writing, March CPS data are available for years Recent Trends in Compensation Inequality    9 7
1992 to 2007 via the Ferret download system at http:/  /  dataferrett.census
.gov/ index.html.
Injury and Fatality Data
For background on these data, see also U.S. Department of Labor (1997) 
and Nestoriak and Ruser (chapter 11 in this volume).
The SOII is a large annual establishment survey that collects informa-
tion on number and rate of nonfatal work- related injuries and illnesses. For 
the subset of injuries that result in days away from work, the SOII collects 
information about the aﬀected workers and their cases. These data include 
age and gender, the occupation held by the worker, and the industry of the 
employer; they do not include earnings or hours worked by individuals. For 
national data the SOII scope is private employers, excluding small farms.
The CFOI is an annual census of all work-  related fatalities in the United 
States. It is based on compiled information from multiple sources, including 
death certiﬁ  cates, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
reports, police records, and media reports. The CFOI and SOII data have 
similar data ﬁ  elds. The scope of the fatality census is much broader than 
the SOII survey as it includes for example government employees and the 
self- employed. The BLS time series tabulations of fatalities typically exclude 
workers who died in the attacks of September 11, and I follow that conven-
tion here. In this chapter, I also restrict the fatality data to roughly corre-
spond to the scope of the SOII data, primarily by excluding self-  employed 
and government workers.
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Comment  Daniel S. Hamermesh
In his massive and comprehensive eﬀort, Brooks Pierce has demonstrated 
a large body of new facts about the development of the American labor 
market in the last quarter century. The ones that seem most important are 
the following:
1. Except for the very highest centiles, the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) (worker-  based) evidence that most of the rise in wage inequality has 
occurred entirely in the upper half of the wage distribution is conﬁ  rmed 
and strengthened by employer-  based evidence from the Employment Cost 
Index (ECI).
2. The growth in compensation inequality has been even sharper than 
that of earnings inequality, providing very strong evidence for a high income 
elasticity of demand for nonwage compensation.
3. The well-  documented huge decline in workplace injury rates that 
occurred through the mid- 1990s continued steadily through the early 2000s 
and, most interestingly, was matched by nearly as sharp declines in work-
place fatalities. These decreases are observed at all points of the wage dis-
tribution.
I have no diﬃculties at all with most of Pierce’s calculations and, indeed, 
admire both their breadth and depth. I am somewhat bothered by the treat-
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